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THIS IS GUN COUNTRY: THE 
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. 
GUN CONTROL POLICY 
Laura Mehalko* 
Abstract: Mexican drug trafficking organizations are the largest providers 
of illicit drugs to the United States. They have also grown to rely on ad-
vanced, high-power weaponry and to use their nearly military-grade ar-
mament to maintain control over smuggling corridors, and local drug 
production areas. Cartels are also linked to nearly 40,000 deaths over the 
last five years, many of which were committed with guns originating in the 
United States. The United States is likely the most prevalent source of 
weapons for the increasingly violent cartels. The U.S. government esti-
mates that nearly ninety percent of all weapons used in the drug war orig-
inate in the United States. An analysis of current gun control policy in the 
United States and Mexico suggests this is likely the case; Mexico has par-
ticularly strict gun control laws in contrast to the relatively lenient gun 
control regulation in the United States. Both countries have implemented 
domestic policies aimed at reducing the southward flow of arms into Mex-
ico, yet so far have had little success. This Note argues that arms trafficking 
has been facilitated by current U.S. gun control policy, and it will likely 
continue without a foundational shift in either U.S. or international policy. 
It’s a terrible problem. They have to do something about it. 
—The Honorable Robert Gottsfield1 
Introduction 
 The rhetoric of the “War on Drugs” has been familiar to many U.S. 
citizens since the days of President Richard M. Nixon.2 That language 
has taken on a more literal meaning in recent years due to the in-
 
* Laura Mehalko is the Executive Comments Editor for the Boston College International 
& Comparative Law Review. She would like to dedicate this note to the memory of her fa-
ther, Mark. Thank you for all the love. 
1 James V. Grimaldi & Sara Horwitz, Mexican Cartels Wielding American Weapons, Wash. 
Post, Dec. 13, 2010, at A1 (describing the inability to address arms trafficking to Mexico). 
2 See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 783, 797–98 
(2004) (noting that President Nixon increased national focus on drug abuse during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s). 
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creased threat posed by Mexican drug cartels and distribution net-
works.3 The Mexican government now faces an opponent that out-
spends it in the fight, while utilizing a governmental task force that has 
been plagued with murders from and defections to the cartels them-
selves.4 Mexico’s governmental efforts to reduce drug trafficking and 
associated gun crime have been met with a violent response from the 
cartels, including executions and mutilations, as well as a drug-related 
murder rate that doubled between 2007 and 2008.5 
 The cartels are fueled by U.S. demand for drugs; many use their 
profits to purchase high-powered firearms from states along the border, 
where they can legally obtain weapons that are prohibited for sale in 
Mexico.6 In an effort to combat the threat presented by the Mexican 
cartels, the United States offered Mexico an aid package that provides 
funding for military, police, and joint intelligence operations.7 Yet by 
increasing support to the Mexican military, the United States has, in 
essence, armed both sides of the conflict.8 
 Federal gun control policies in the United States, and state-level 
policies in the southwestern states, are a major factor in the increasing 
violence against both Mexican and U.S. citizens—that includes both in-
creased murders and kidnappings domestically as well as over 40,000 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Stephanie Erin Brewer, Rethinking the Mérida Initiative: Why the U.S. Must Change 
Course in Its Approach to Mexico’s Drug War, Hum. Rts. Brief, Spring 2009, at 9, 10 (“[I]t 
reinforces the war-like mentality that has led Mexico to deploy its military and police in a 
territorial battle as the answer to drug trafficking.”). 
4 Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35 N.C. J. Int’l L. & 
Com. Reg. 363, 365–66 (2010); Peter Andreas, The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in 
Mexico, Current Hist., Apr. 1998, at 160, 164 (noting that the head of the federal anti-drug 
agency was arrested after it was discovered that he worked for the Juárez cartel); The War Next 
Door: Horrific Brutality of Mexican Drug Cartels ‘Makes al Qaeda Look Tame,’ Daily Mail (Oct. 25, 
2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1323458/Meixcandrugcartelshorrificbrutal- 
itymakesalQaedalooktame.html (noting that a dozen Mexican mayors had been killed in 
drug related violence). 
5 Wright, supra note 4, at 367. 
6 Id. at 369; James C. McKinley, U.S. Is a Vast Arms Bazaar for Mexican Cartels, N.Y. Times 
Feb. 26, 2009, at A1. 
7 Stephen E. Hendrix, The Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: The New Para-
digm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized Crime, Corruption and Violence, 5 Loy. U. Chi. 
Int’l L. Rev. 107, 113 (2008); The Mérida Initiative: Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t State ( June 23, 
2009), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/122397.htm. 
8 See Brewer, supra note 3, at 10 (“[T]his strategy has not led to a decrease in drug-
related violence but rather has seen a tripling of drug–related homicides in the past three 
years.”); McKinley, supra note 6 (“ATF officials estimate 90 percent of the weapons recov-
ered in Mexico come from dealers north of the border.”). 
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murders in Mexico since 2006.9 Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) purchase firearms in the United States, where there is greater 
access to weapons and more lenient regulation on sales.10 Moreover, 
many of the relevant purchases are made in Arizona and Texas, where 
the emphasis on the individual right to own firearms is manifested in 
relatively lenient gun control laws.11 These two states, along with Cali-
fornia, host the top twelve dealers that are allegedly arming the cartels.12 
 Arms trafficking is unlikely to decrease without increased coopera-
tion between the United States and Mexico.13 Although regulations 
restricting trafficking are likely constitutional, cultural factors in the 
southwestern states make domestic reform, tightening restrictions on 
firearms sales, unlikely.14 One commentator suggested that lax regula-
tions in Texas and Arizona “reflect both the libertarian traditions of the 
West and the anxious vigilance of firearms enthusiasts toward their Se-
cond Amendment rights.”15 State gun control laws impose few restric-
tions on firearms sales, making prosecution of those accused of trans-
acting with Mexican cartels more difficult.16 Further, state laws creating 
an individual right to bear arms now find support in the federal Second 
                                                                                                                      
9 Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States) 
[hereinafter Holder, Statement Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary] (noting that in 
recent years the trafficking of firearms has led to approximately 40,000 deaths, and that 
the United States has recovered 64,000 guns attributable to U.S. sales); see also U.S. Ambas-
sador to Mexico Resigns After Public Spat, Reuters (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/03/20/us-mexico-usa-idUSTRE72J09F20110320 (noting that the death toll was 
at 36,000 in March 2011). 
10 See McKinley, supra note 6. 
11 See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & 
Pol’y 191, 193, 203 (2006) (noting that Arizona and Texas have recognized a constitu-
tional individual right to own firearms since 1912 and 1836, respectively). 
12 See Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1. 
13 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-709, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. 
Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination 
Challenges 4 (2009) (describing several challenges to combating arms trafficking due to 
a lack of cooperation within U.S. agencies and between the United States and Mexico). 
14 See, e.g., Jerod E. Tufte, Comment, Some Explicitly Guaranteed Rights Are More Funda-
mental Than Others: The Right to Bear Arms in Arizona, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 341 passim (2001). 
This comment was written from the perspective of an Arizona resident and suggests that 
the “right to bear arms is sufficiently important that it deserves stronger protection from 
the courts.” Id. at 342. 
15 Karl Vick, Gun-Trafficking Crackdown Hits Hurdle, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 2009, at A3. 
16 See Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1 (quoting Arizona Judge Robert Gottsfield) 
(“There certainly was evidence that [arms dealer] Iknadosian was selling to people who 
were not buying the guns for themselves, and that’s a class one misdemeanor.”). But see 
United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 379 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding a sentence im-
posed against an arms dealer convicted of supplying Mexican drug cartels). 
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Amendment policy that was incorporated to the states in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago.17 
 Despite Mexican attempts to regulate the illicit arms trade,18 arms 
trafficking has proliferated, operating either in accordance with gun 
control regulations or outside the reach of government action.19 Mex-
ico is known for its particularly strict gun control laws and has only one 
operating gun store in the country.20 Yet, between 2004 and 2008, the 
government seized nearly five times as many firearms from drug crimes 
as there are legal permits.21 Government efforts to restrict access to 
firearms have thus proven ineffective in the drug war.22 
 This rise in international crime, or “crime that crosses interna-
tional borders,”23 has not been met with a coherent international effort 
intended to reduce access to high powered weapons by the DTOs.24 
Under the current legal framework, it is likely that arms trafficking will 
continue, and any attempt by Mexico to reduce the illicit arms trade 
and related violence will be undermined by U.S. policy.25 
                                                                                                                      
17 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050–51 (2010). 
18 David B. Kopel, Mexico’s Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives 5–6 (Univ. Denver Legal 
Sturm Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 10-12, 2010) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1588296 (describing Mexican Gun Control regulations). 
19 See James C. McKinley, U.S. Stymied as Guns Flow to Mexican Cartels, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
15, 2009, at A1. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Colby Goodman & Michel Marizco, U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: New Data and 
Insights Illuminate Key Trends and Challenges, in Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Pol-
icy Options for Confronting Organized Crime 167, 169–70 (Eric L. Olson et al. eds., 
2010). 
23 Herbert Morais, Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The Importance of Follow-
ing a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of Law, 50 Vill. L. Rev. 583, 584 (2005). 
24 See Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 273, 296 (2002) (noting that international crimes that “involve or impact” 
human rights violations, including arms trafficking, are increasing); Bruce Zagaris, Devel-
opments in the Institutional Architecture and Framework of International Criminal and Enforcement 
Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, 37 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 421, 425 (2005) (“The 
United States has dominated and exerted controlling influence over the efforts to evolve 
the hemisphere’s criminal justice toward harmonization and improve international crimi-
nal cooperation.”). 
25 See discussion infra Part III; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 
58 (“U.S. and Mexican government officials in locations we visited told us that, while they 
have undertaken some efforts to combat illicit arms trafficking, they are concerned that 
without a targeted, comprehensive, and coordinated U.S. government effort, their efforts 
could fall short.”); cf. Donald E. deKieffer, The Mexican Drug Connection: How Trade in Phar-
maceuticals Has Wrecked the FDA, 9 Sw. J.L. & Trade Ams. 321, 328–29 (2002) (suggesting 
that domestic regulations become meaningless when undermined by a prevalent illegal 
black market trading system). 
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 Part I of this Note outlines the Mexican cartels’ rise to power as the 
prominent source of wholesale drugs for the U.S. market. Additionally, 
Part I highlights the current state of legal policy in relation to arms traf-
ficking as demonstrated by the attempted prosecution of prominent 
arms dealer George Iknadosian. Part II discusses the implications of the 
asymmetries between U.S. and Mexican gun control policy in the con-
text of arms trafficking to Mexican cartels. Specifically, Part II notes 
that U.S. gun control regulations dominate the arms trafficking pat-
tern, and for practical purposes are the only relevant authority in terms 
of regulating arms trafficking to Mexico. Finally, Part III argues that 
regulations directed at arms trafficking would be constitutional, but are 
unlikely to be made without consideration of foreign implications of 
domestic policy. It notes that Mexico’s gun-control regulations are at 
continued risk of arbitrage without potential for remedy, and that the 
United States may be the only entity capable of providing a solution. 
I. Background 
A. The Rise and Operation of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations 
 The nearly 2000 mile border between the United States and Mex-
ico represents the trade boundary where large amounts of illicit drugs 
are smuggled into the United States and where many illegal firearms, 
weapons and currency are shipped back into Mexico.26 Mexican DTOs 
are currently the predominant source of illicit drugs in the United 
States, having largely replaced the Colombian cartels.27 It is estimated 
that the DTOs earn tens of billions of dollars each year as wholesale 
providers of illicit drugs.28 Mexican drug trafficking organizations have 
grown to be so powerful that they have been called “driving forces, pil-
lars even, of [Mexican] economic growth.”29 The U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) estimates that billions of dollars enter the Mexican 
                                                                                                                      
26 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 20; Andreas, supra note 4, 
at 160; see also Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1. Texas gun dealer Bill Carter, who has sold 
more guns seized in Mexico than any other dealer in Houston, commented on the border 
traffic: “Why all the talk about guns going south when so many drugs are coming north 
that our cows along the interstate are gettin’ high off the fumes!” Id. 
27 See Dep’t. of Justice, Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 2010-Q0317-001, National 
Drug Threat Assessment 2010, at 9 (2010); Luis Astorga & David A. Shirk, Drug Traffick-
ing Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context, in Shared Respon-
sibility, supra note 22, at 33; Andreas, supra note 4, at 160–61. 
28 Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 27, at 9. 
29 Andreas, supra note 4, at 160 (quoting Eduardo Valle, personal advisor to the Mexi-
can attorney general in 1994). 
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economy each year as a result of the drug trade, and that hundreds of 
thousands of Mexican citizens earn their living growing drug crops or 
providing transportation, security, banking, and communications ser-
vices to the various DTOs.30 
 The growing violence in Mexico is associated with a few “large, so-
phisticated and vicious criminal organizations” engaged in the illicit 
drug trade.31 Perhaps as a result of their growing influence, there has 
been greater conflict between the DTOs over maintenance of “zones of 
control” and smuggling routes into the United States.32 In addition to 
the growing conflict between the most predominant DTOs, organiza-
tions without established trafficking routes utilize governmental disrup-
tion of larger cartels to gain an advantage in the market, leading to 
“unprecedented, high intensity violence.”33 In 2009 alone, an estimated 
6500 to 8000 individuals were killed as DTOs battled for control over 
smuggling corridors.34 Although most of the dead were associated with 
the cartels themselves, since 2006 approximately 2000 police officers 
and Mexican soldiers have been murdered in drug related violence.35 
 DTOs have also increasingly engaged in public conflicts and in 
assassinations of Mexican officials.36 The DTOs’ attempts to exert po-
litical and social control signify their intention to expand their power 
beyond what might typically be associated with criminal organiza-
tions.37 For example, drug gangs have enforced their own laws and 
even impose “fees like taxes” as a means of maintaining social and geo-
graphic control over trafficking areas.38 
                                                                                                                     
 U.S. and Mexican government officials estimate that DTOs primar-
ily use guns originating in the United States.39 The United States esti-
mates that thousands of guns are smuggled into Mexico every year, of-
 
30 Id. 
31 Escalating Violence in Mexico and the Southwest Border as a Result of the Illicit Drug Trade: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 18 (2009) 
(statement of Stuart G. Nash, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.; Director, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
32 See Astorga & Shirk, supra note 27, at 33–35. 
33 Id. at 13. 
34 Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 27, at 15; Julian Miglierini, Crunching Numbers in Mex-
ico’s Drug Conflict, BBC News ( Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldlatin 
america12194138 (suggesting that a new, more complete database estimates that 34,612 
people have been killed between 2006 and late 2010). 
35 See Elisabeth Malkin, Lawmakers in Mexico to Debate Drug Fight, N.Y. Times Aug. 18, 
2010, at A12. 
36 Goodman & Marizco, supra note 22, at 168–69, 171–73. 
37 See id. 
38 Calderon: Mexico Drug Gangs Seek to Replace State, BBC News (Aug. 5, 2010), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldlatinamerica10877156. 
39 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 22. 
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ten orchestrated by the DTOs themselves.40 The United States hosts 
nearly 7000 gun stores along the Mexican border.41 Moreover, the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has determined that ap-
proximately eighty-seven percent of firearms seized by Mexican authori-
ties in the last five years originated in the United States, with heavy 
concentrations of relevant purchases in Texas, California, and Ari-
zona.42 In total, tracing data from guns seized after drug crimes demon-
strate that ninety percent of the firearms originate in the United 
tate
ered inca-
                                                                                                                     
S s.43 
 Drug-related violence has risen partly due to the cartel’s ability to 
acquire high powered weapons.44 It is estimated that over 15,000 people 
were killed in 2010 alone.45 As DTOs increasingly use high-caliber 
weapons, competing groups must respond by utilizing competitive 
weapons to maintain their market control.46 Mexican officials have not-
ed a trend toward increasingly “powerful and lethal” weapons— specifi-
cally higher caliber and high-power weapons.47 For example, the Gulf-
Zeta cartel now employs RPG-7 rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, gre-
nades, submachine guns, and “cop killers” —handguns known for their 
potential to pierce bulletproof vests.48 Mexican law enforcement utilizes 
weapons far less advanced than the DTOs, and is often rend
pable of effectively responding to instances of gun violence.49 
 
40 See Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 27, at 16. 
41 Id. at 3. 
42 Id. at 20. Some commentators have questioned this statistic. E.g., Kopel, supra note 
18, at 12 (“Professor George W. Grayson [of the Center for Strategic & International Stud-
ies] calls the ninety percent factoid a ‘widely exaggerated percentage,’ which is being 
pushed by President Calderón for purposes of domestic Mexican politics.”). But see U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 69–72 (acknowledging the controversy 
but stating that the eighty-seven percent statistic is not misleading). 
43 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 15–16 (noting that the da-
ta available relates only to gun trace requests submitted from seizures in Mexico, not all 
guns seized). 
44 See Luis Astorga, IDPC Policy Briefing—Arms Trafficking from the United 
States to Mexico: Divergent Responsibilities 1 (Lucien Chauvin trans., 2010), avail-
able at http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/IDPC%20policy%20briefing%20 
Mexico.pdf(“Violence is always a possibility in any illegal activity, but the magnitude of the 
current violence is largely related to the availability of high powered firearms being traf-
ficked across the border from United States to Mexico.”). 
45 See Malkin, supra note 35; see also Miglierini, supra note 34 (suggesting that 2010 was 
the “bloodiest year yet”). 
46 See Astorga, supra note 44, at 2. 
47 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 17. 
48 Id. at 3. 
49 See Astorga, supra note 44, at 1; Goodman & Marizco, supra note 22, at 187–88. 
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 Although much of the violence is concentrated in Mexico, the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) and the National Drug Intelligence Center 
considers Mexican DTOs the gravest organized crime threat facing the 
United States today.50 In addition to establishing drug distribution net-
works in at least 230 U.S. cities, Mexican cartels have been associated 
with shootings, kidnappings and assaults in the United States.51 More-
over, without increased restrictions on access to weapons, U.S. law en-
forcement will be unable to effectively respond to any further escala-
tions
s 
ws 
Egypt, owned a store near the Mexican border named X-Calibur Guns, 
                                                                                                                     
 of gun violence.52 
B. The George Iknadosian Trial: U.S. Treatment of Arms Traffickers 
 The United States has acknowledged it is the source of the major-
ity of weapons used by the DTOs.53 Despite this recognition, however, 
current U.S. gun control regulations do not facilitate the investigation 
or prosecution of those suspected to be involved in gun smuggling.54 
Mexican officials have urged the U.S. government to supplement it
la to restrict access to certain weapons, particularly in light of the fact 
that it is nearly impossible for DTOs to purchase firearms in Mexico.55 
 One of the most prominent attempted prosecutions of a U.S. citi-
zen for supplying guns to Mexican drug cartels occurred in Arizona 
state court in 2009.56 George Iknadosian was charged with fraud, con-
spiracy, and assisting a criminal syndicate, based on alleged weapon sales 
to smugglers supplying the Sinaloa drug cartel.57 Iknadosian, a native of 
 
50 Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Responsibilities; 
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. passim (2009) ( joint 
statement of Joseph M. Arabit, Special Agent in Charge El Paso Div. DEA/DOJ and Wil-
liam McMahon, Deputy Assistant Dir. Field Operations ATF/DOJ). [hereinafter Arabit & 
McMahon Testimony]. 
51 See Randal Archibold, U.S. Stymied as Guns Flow to Mexican Cartels, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
15, 2009, at A1. 
52 Id. 
53 See Ginger Thompson & Marc Lacey, U.S. and Mexico Revise Joint Antidrug Strategy, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2010, at A4 (quoting Sec. of State Hillary Rodham Clinton) (“Yes, we 
accept our share of the responsibility.”). 
54 See Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1 (describing the dismissal of a case against an 
accused arms dealer). 
55 See Mary Beth Sheridan, Treaty to Curb Gun Smuggling to Mexico Remains Stalled, Wash. 
Post, Oct. 22, 2010, at A19. 
56 See McKinley, supra note 6; Dennis Wagner, Trial of Phoenix Gun Seller to Start, Ariz. 
Republic, (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.azcentral.com/community/phoenix/articles/2009/ 
03/09/20090309guns0309.html (“The case has drawn international attention as a land-
mark effort against gunrunning.”). 
57 McKinley, supra note 6. 
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and was accused of selling over 700 firearms with the knowledge that the 
weapons were bought on behalf of DTOs.58 Iknadosian’s clients pur-
chased guns largely prohibited from private ownership in Mexico, in-
cluding AK-47s, SKS rifles, and .50-caliber rifles.59 X-Calibur Guns sold a 
large number of weapons implicated in illicit gun trafficking, so much 
so that ATF officials believed they had discovered a “direct pipeline 
from Iknadosian to the Sinaloa cartel.”60 In fact, U.S. officials traced ri-
fles back to Iknadosian and X-Calibur after Mexican officials recovered 
them at the scene of a gunfight that left eight Mexican police officers 
dead.61 Similarly, Arizona prosecutors believed that a narcotics crime 
boss had on his person an Iknadosian pistol with a $35,000 diamond-
ield stated, “It’s a 
rri
entirely outside the reach of U.S. law enforcement.69 Yet the Iknadosian 
                                                                                                                     
studded map of Sinaloa on the butt of the gun when he was arrested.62 
 The ATF brought the case to Arizona attorney general Terry God-
dard, who investigated Iknadosian for over a year with the Phoenix Po-
lice Department.63 The department’s evidence against Iknadosian was 
extensive, and included his advice on sneaking weapons across the 
border:64 “When you guys buy them [guns], I run the paperwork, 
you’re ok, you’re gone. On my end, I don’t give a crap.”65 Moreover, his 
nine co-defendants all pled guilty in return for reduced charges and 
sentences.66 Judge Robert Gottsfield dismissed the case, finding that 
the charges against Iknadosian were too severe, and that many of the 
sales were legitimate.67 Concerning the allegations that the guns were 
headed directly to Mexico after purchase, Judge Gottsf
te ble problem. They have to do something about it.”68 
 Persons involved in arms trafficking to drug cartels have not been 
 
McKinley, supra note 6 (quoting Thomas G. Mangan, spokesman for the federal 
ATF
ell) (“The officers ‘ran out of ammunition in 
the fight’ . . . . ‘They got overwhelmed.’”). 
aldi & Horwitz, supra note 1. 
 people 
who
 
58 Id. 
59 See Wagner, supra note 56. 
60 
). 
61 Michel Marizco, Toxicity in Arms Trafficking, Law Enforcement Tech., Sept. 1, 2009, 
at 10, 14 (quoting ATF Agent William New
62 Id. 
63 Grim
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Wagner, supra note 56. 
67 Marizco, supra note 61, at 14; see Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1 (quoting Arizona 
Judge Robert Gottsfield) (“There certainly was evidence that Iknadosian was selling to
 were not buying the guns for themselves, and that’s a class one misdemeanor.”). 
68 Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1 (quoting Arizona Judge Robert Gottsfield). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 379 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding a 97-
month sentence for supplying the Zeta cartel with 103 firearms, 23 of which were military-
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case highlights the problems associated with enforcing criminal sanc-
tions within the context of Mexican gun trafficking.70 Specifically, a 
lack of tailored legislation makes convictions difficult.71 Nevertheless, 
those opposed to gun control, including members of the powerful gun 
lobby, do not agree that more restrictions would curb drug violence in 
Mexico.72 Mexican residents, on the other hand, believe that restricting 
access to weapons in the United States would help reduce both the 
number and caliber of arms available to the DTOs.73 As one Mexican 
resident observed, “If the United States had a system like ours, we 
wouldn’t have so many problems here in Mexico.”74 
II. Discussion 
 The high level of drug trafficking and the increasing violence has 
resulted in heightened efforts by both the U.S. and Mexican govern-
ments to disarm and dismantle DTO operations at the border.75 Al-
though the United States and Mexico have engaged in a variety of ini-
tiatives to address the gun smuggling problem, many have been 
unsuccessful because of structural problems or insufficient funding.76 
Consequently, little headway has been made to reduce arms trafficking 
                                                                                                                      
style assault rifles); United States v. Gutierrez, 359 Fed. Appx. 540, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding sentence of 46 months for making materially false statements to a federally li-
censed firearms dealer). 
70 See Grimaldi & Horwitz, supra note 1; McKinley supra note 6. 
71 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 38; Grimaldi & Horwitz, 
supra note 1. 
72 See Chris Cox, Mexico’s Drug Wars: Will Gun Owners Be the Scapegoats?, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n 
Inst. for Legis. Action (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.nraila.org/Issues/Articles/Read.aspx? 
id=354&issue=014; Chris Hawley, Mexico Says Gun Controls Undermined by U.S. Laws, USA 
Today, Apr. 1, 2009, at 5A. 
73 See Hawley, supra note 72. 
74 Id. (quoting Agustin Villordo, a Mexican resident of Puebla). 
75 See John Bailey, Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico: What Are 
Mexican and U.S. Strategies? Are They Working?, in Shared Responsibility, supra note 22, at 
327–28, 340–41; Randal C. Archibold, National Guard Will Be Deployed at Border, N.Y. Times, 
May 25, 2010, at A1 (noting President Obama’s intention to seek increased spending on 
law enforcement to combat drug smuggling in response to bipartisan pressures). 
76 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 57–58 (noting there has 
not even been a coordinated effort between U.S. agencies); Brewer, supra note 3, at 9 (“Yet 
an examination of the current Mexican and regional context leads to the conclusion that 
without a paradigm shift in design, the hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars earmarked 
for the Mérida Initiative and other antidrug aid to Mexico will fuel a dysfunctional ap-
proach to public security.”); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., 
Evaluation & Inspections Div., I-2009-006, Interim Review of ATF’s Project Gun-
runner 34 (Sept. 2009) (noting that the ATF’s resources are not utilized efficiently and 
the strategies for reviewing success of the program are insufficient). 
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to Mexico.77 The Mexican government under President Calderón em-
ployed the military to combat the DTOs.78 The United States has initi-
ated programs to aid Mexico’s government, but there has not been 
consistent cooperation between U.S. and Mexican police and armed 
forces.79 Despite the attempted alliance between the two governments, 
arms trafficking has proliferated under the existing framework.80 
A. Gun Control in the United States 
 The United States has a strong policy favoring limited regulation 
of firearm ownership.81 At the federal level, the Gun Control Act of 
1968 permits a wide range of purchasing and sale rights to licensed 
dealers, including rights to interstate and foreign transfer of weapons.82 
The Act also places limits on who may own and purchase firearms.83 
Additionally, it regulates the administration of federal permits to sell 
firearms, and in many instances, it allows licensed sellers to transport 
an unlimited number of weapons in interstate and foreign commerce 
without reporting those sales to federal authorities.84 Particularly rele-
vant to arms trafficking, the Act makes it illegal for a licensed dealer to 
knowingly transfer weapons to an unlicensed person who lives out of 
state, yet it permits the sale of weapons to an unlicensed person if the 
transaction is completed at the dealer’s place of business.85 Similarly, 
under the Act it is illegal for any seller to transfer a firearm to a prohib-
ited person, although the enforcement mechanisms are limited to li-
                                                                                                                      
77 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 59 (recommending great-
er intelligence sharing and cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican governments). 
78 Bailey, supra note 75, at 328 (“Its central logic was to employ the armed forces, prin-
cipally the Army, to confront armed bands of criminals in selected locales in order to dis-
rupt their activities and to buy time to implement a long menu of institutional reforms.”). 
79 See id. at 340. 
80 See Wright, supra note 4, at 369 (“It is largely the demand from the United States for 
drugs that makes the drug business profitable, and the United States’ commerce in fire-
arms that makes the cartel business more deadly.”); U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Resigns, supra 
note 9 (noting the alliance between the United States and Mexico has been damaged due 
to the failure of the United States to stop arms trafficking to Mexico). 
81 See McMann v. City of Tucson, 47 P.3d 672, 674 (2002) (describing Arizona state leg-
islation intended to prevent the enactment of municipal gun control legislation); Sari 
Horwitz & James V. Grimaldi, Firearms Watchdog on Short Lease, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 2010, 
at A1 (quoting an NRA fact sheet) (“Those who wonder what motivates American gun 
owners should understand that perhaps only one word in the English language so boils 
their blood as ‘registration,’ and that word is ‘confiscation.’”). 
82 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)–(5) (1968). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. passim. 
85 Id. § 922(b)(3). 
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censed dealers.86 As a result, the problem of illicit sales by unlicensed 
dealers falls outside the scope of the Act.87 
 In addition to federal legislation, U.S. Second Amendment policy 
was recently redefined by the Supreme Court.88 In District of Columbia v. 
Heller, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Second Amendment “guaran-
tee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of con-
frontation.”89 Only two years later, Heller was affirmed and the Second 
Amendment was incorporated against the states as an individual right 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago.90 
 In Heller, the Court considered whether a District of Columbia 
prohibition on the possession of functional handguns in the home vio-
lated the Second Amendment.91 The ordinance also required that any 
lawfully owned firearms be kept unloaded and inoperable when not 
being used for recreational activities.92 The case arose after Dick Heller, 
a police officer in the District of Columbia, was denied a registration 
certificate for a handgun he desired to keep at home.93 Heller filed suit 
in District Court, seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing the hand-
gun restrictions on Second Amendment grounds.94 After engaging in a 
lengthy analysis of the linguistics and history of the Second Amend-
ment, the Court held that the District’s handgun ban amounted to a 
Second Amendment violation in that it forbids “use for protection of 
one’s home and family.”95 
 Two years later, McDonald v. City of Chicago incorporated the indi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms established in Heller to all fifty 
states.96 Heller addressed the issue within the confines of a federal en-
                                                                                                                      
86See id. § 922(s), (t). 
87See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(II) (requiring only licensed sellers to perform background 
checks or verify the identity of buyer). 
88 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 passim (2010); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 passim (2008) (outlining the debate of Second Amendment interpre-
tation as either a right to maintain a militia or an individual right to own firearms, and 
resolving the debate as a right for individuals); Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations 
After Heller: Speculation About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1432–33 (2009) 
(noting that the Court’s decisions have created a barrier to constitutional challenges of 
most federal gun regulations). 
89 554 U.S. at 570. 
90 130 S. Ct. at 3050–51. 
91 554 U.S. at 573. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 574–75. 
94 Id. at 575–76 
95 Id. at 628–29. 
96 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026–27. 
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clave, and therefore did not address state firearm regulations.97 The 
case was filed against the city only hours after Heller came down, alleg-
ing that the Chicago ordinances were in violation of the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments.98 The Court rejected the petitioner’s chal-
lenge under the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.99 Instead, the Court engaged in a selective incorporation 
analysis, ultimately determining that the “right to keep and bear arms 
[is] among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of or-
dered liberty.”100 The Court thus agreed with the petitioner’s conten-
tion that the law essentially prevented citizens from defend themselves, 
leaving them more susceptible to injury and gun-related crime.101 In 
the end, the Court held that the Second Amendment as recognized in 
Heller would be incorporated through the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.102 
 While the individual right to keep and bear arms is not without 
limits, it is also without a clear category of exception.103 Both Heller and 
McDonald recognize the necessity of governmental regulations in cer-
tain circumstances.104 Heller stressed that the right would not extend to 
every manner and purpose, and included a list of exceptions where 
prohibitions on ownership would be reasonable.105 The Court permits 
prohibitions for “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” without 
providing a standard for determining which regulations might fit into 
that category.106 The Court did not elucidate a standard for evaluating 
gun regulations, instead reasoning that “there will be time enough to 
expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have 
mentioned if those exceptions come before us.”107 
 Overall, Heller addresses the individual right to carry arms for the 
purpose of self-defense.108 Therefore, it is unlikely that Heller or McDon-
ald would prohibit certain regulations aimed at reducing drug traffick-
                                                                                                                      
97 Eileen Kaufman, The Second Amendment: An Analysis of District of Columbia v. Heller, 
25 Touro L. Rev. 703, 704 (2009). 
98 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027; Kaufman, supra note 97, at 723. 
99 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31. 
100 Id. at 3042–43. 
101 See id. at 3043–44. 
102 Id. at 3044–45. 
103 See Kaufman, supra note 97, at 711–12. 
104 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047–49; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
105 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
106 See id. at 627 n.26. 
107 Id. at 635. 
108 Id. at 626–27, 629. 
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ing.109 While the Court in Heller seemed to apply a strict-scrutiny analy-
sis to regulations aimed at restricting law-abiding person’s access to 
weapons, a regulation only peripherally related to the individual’s ac-
cess to weapons would probably receive only intermediate scrutiny.110 
This would likely include laws aimed at gun-trafficking, which might 
include registration requirements, or increased efforts to funnel sales 
through regulated, licensed sellers.111 
 One relevant issue to be addressed in the future will be the consti-
tutionality of regulations requiring registration of guns by the federal 
government.112 The federal government’s inability to trace firearms has 
hampered policing of gun trafficking.113 Yet gun-rights advocates are 
wary of registration requirements and the “slippery slope” from registra-
tion to confiscation.114 Heller suggests that registration requirements will 
be constitutional so long as they do not amount to a complete ban.115 
 Firearms are further regulated at the state level.116 All states oper-
ate under federal gun control laws, but it is within their discretion to 
enhance those regulations with additional requirements for background 
checks and dealer inspections by state officials.117 Some states, including 
those along the southwestern border, have opted not to enact additional 
regulations, and therefore have relatively limited gun control laws.118 
                                                                                                                      
 
109 See id. at 626–29 (noting that although a complete ban on handguns is unconstitu-
tional, other regulations would likely withstand a Second Amendment challenge). 
110 See id. at 626–27, 634–35 (noting that the Second Amendment right is not unlim-
ited, but also that it is not to be subject to a “freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach”); 
U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (finding that government regula-
tions concerned with constitutional rights will be subjected to heightened scrutiny). 
111 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047–49; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. 
112 See Tushnet, supra note 88, at 1436. 
113 Dep’t of Justice, Joint Staff Report, The Department of Justice’s Operation 
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115 See id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
116 See Mayors Against Illegal Guns, The Movement of Illegal Guns in America 
Report 3 (2008) (“The key finding of this report is that states that supply crime guns at 
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117 Id. at 2. 
118 Id; see Fredrick Kunkle, Gun Toting Soccer Moms a Scary Thought in D.C. Area, but Not 
out West, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ 
content/article/2010/08/17/AR2010081705427.html (quoting Hildy Saizow, President of 
Arizonans for Gun Safety) (“Out here in the Southwest, it’s really a Wild West mentality. 
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This is perhaps not surprising, as many residents in those states place 
special emphasis on a broad reading of the Second Amendment, and 
prefer relaxed restrictions on firearms.119 In fact, an individual right to 
keep firearms was recognized in state constitutions in Arizona and Tex-
as, long before the Court’s decision in Heller.120 
  In general, states implicated in arms trafficking to DTOs, includ-
ing Arizona and Texas, have done little to augment federal regulations 
on selling weapons.121 Moreover, state regulations in Arizona and Texas 
do not include provisions on registration, or bans on assault weap-
ons.122 For example, Arizona permits the sale of high-caliber assault 
rifles to American citizens who present identification without requiring 
dealers to report those sales to the government.123 Similarly, Texas law 
makes sales of handguns illegal only if the seller “knowingly” transfers 
the weapon to a person who intends to use that weapon unlawfully.124 
Gun regulations in the border states ensure that citizens can own 
weapons with very few restrictions.125 
B. Gun Control in Mexico 
 In contrast, Mexico has adopted particularly strict gun control 
laws.126 Currently, there is only one firearm store in the entire country; 
it is located in Mexico City, and operated by the military.127 In order to 
obtain a permit to own a firearm, a person must apply at a military 
base, and demonstrate that he: (1) lives an honest life; (2) has com-
                                                                                                                      
People are willing to accept the fact that people are walking around with guns on their 
hips.”). 
119 See McKinley, supra note 6 (noting an alleged arms dealer engaged in illegal traf-
ficking moved to Arizona to take advantage of the more lenient laws); Vick, supra note 15. 
120 Volokh, supra note 11, at 193, 203. 
121 See Kunkle, supra note 118 (comparing the strict handgun restrictions in the D.C. to 
those in Arizona, which require only a computerized background check to obtain a hand-
gun). 
122 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-31 passim (2010) (containing no explicit ban on as-
sault rifles or requirements for registration); 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 36 passim (1997) (no 
requirements for registration or bans on assault weapons); Vick, supra note 15 (quoting 
Jacob Allerd, a private collector and firearms dealer in Arizona) (“No paperwork, nothing 
. . . . Just an Arizona license. And proof you’re over 21.”). 
123 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3108(B), (C) (2010). 
124 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.06(a)(1) (West 1997). 
125 See Kunkle, supra note 118 (“But their bill reflects a philosophy that seems part of 
the American West’s genome. Even Arizona’s flag, based on a design created by the team 
captain of the former territory’s rifle team during a national rifle match almost a hundred 
years ago, symbolizes the way guns are woven into the state’s politics and culture.”). 
126 See Hawley, supra note 72; Kopel, supra note 18, at 6–7. 
127 Kopel, supra note 18, at 6. 
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pleted any required military service; (3) has not been convicted of any 
crimes involving weapons; and (4) does not use any drugs.128 To receive 
a permit, a person must also show that he has a justifiable reason for 
owning a weapon.129 Unless the person obtains a permit for use as a 
governmental employee, he must have his permit reissued every two 
years.130 Additionally, private ownership is limited to low-power fire-
arms, primarily those smaller than .22 caliber.131 Anyone who uses or 
sells a weapon of a higher caliber, specifically those restricted for mili-
tary use, may face a prison sentence of up to thirty years.132 In contrast 
to U.S. regulations, Mexico has established a national registry for fire-
arms, and requires that all weapons be reported to the government for 
inclusion in a database.133 
 In an effort to enhance its own laws and reduce arms imported 
from the United States, the Mexican government has attempted to in-
crease its involvement with U.S. security officials along the border.134 To 
control the influx of weapons, the Mexican government has focused on 
seizing illegal weapons, engaging in raids of property associated with 
drug traffickers and inspecting incoming vehicles.135 Additionally, in 
2009, the Mexican government aided U.S. tracing efforts by submitting 
an extensive list of firearms to the ATF’s U.S. database for use in dis-
cerning trafficking patterns.136 Even in light of the strict Mexican regu-
lations and international cooperation, ATF officials and Mexican au-
thorities predict that the DTOs will continue to import weapons from 
U.S. dealers along the border.137 One ATF special agent observed that 
the relative ease of acquiring guns in the United States as compared to 
Mexico will encourage DTO members to continue to travel north 
across the border to purchase firearms.138 
                                                                                                                      
128 Ley Federal de Armas de Fuego y Explosivos [Federal Law of Firearms and Explo-
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C. Effect of the Conflicting Policies 
 Despite strict Mexican regulations, buyers are nevertheless able to 
acquire and import the weapons they desire from U.S. arms dealers.139 
Although the Mexican government granted only 4300 licenses that al-
low persons to carry firearms outside of their homes, between 2004 and 
2008 over 20,000 guns were seized and traced to the United States.140 
In fact, it is estimated that 2000 weapons are brought into Mexico each 
day from the United States.141 Likely, the individuals Mexico aims to 
exclude from permitted gun ownership—those involved in drugs and 
crime—are those most likely to obtain a weapon illegally from the 
United States.142 For these reasons, Mexican officials have described 
the illicit arms market as the most important domestic crime problem, 
and the primary threat to Mexican national security.143 
                                                                                                                     
 Certain U.S. regulations directly facilitate sales to individual DTO 
members, and thus operate in direct conflict to Mexican attempts to 
reduce DTO access to firearms.144 For example, ATF officials are only 
permitted to inspect individual gun stores once a year without a war-
rant.145 Because there are nearly 7000 gun dealers along the border, 
few stores are inspected even annually.146 Although licensed dealers are 
required to inform state or local law enforcement if a non-licensed per-
son purchases more than one handgun within a five day period, there 
is no similar requirement for assault rifles.147 Moreover, sales by unli-
censed dealers are in large part unregulated.148 Lastly, ammunition 
 
139 See Hawley, supra note 72 (quoting Lt. Col. Raúl Manzano Vélez, Director of Civilian 
Gun Sales in Mexico) (“I would dare say that Mexico has some of the strictest regulations 
about gun ownership in all the world, and we’re right next to a country . . . that has some 
of the easiest ones. . . . That creates a huge vacuum between the countries and feeds weap-
ons trafficking.”). 
140 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 15. 
141 Hendrix, supra note 7, at 108. 
142 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 23–24 (noting that most 
arms trafficked into Mexico end up in the hands of the cartels). 
143 Id. at 10. 
144 See Goodman & Marizco, supra note 22, at 195–98 (summarizing certain U.S. regu-
lations that present a contrast to Mexican regulations within the arms trafficking context). 
145 Id. 
146 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 13, at 20 (noting that there are 
over 6700 gun stores along the border); Astorga & Shirk, supra note 27, at 47–48. 
147 See Goodman & Marizco, supra note 22, at 198 (noting that these measures are gen-
erally unenforceable without a registration system that would provide an enforcement 
mechanism). 
148 Id. 
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sales, which occur far more frequently than sales of weapons, are also 
generally unmonitored.149 
 Mexican officials have appealed to U.S. officials for reinstatement 
of the assault weapons ban150 that expired in 2004.151 Mexican Presi-
dent Felipe Calderón suggested that increased violence in Mexico can 
be correlated with greater access to high-power assault weapons.152 In 
fact, one state along the border, Chihuahua, has seen a 1800 percent 
increase in murders between 2007 and 2010.153 The availability of these 
weapons has also negatively impacted Mexican law enforcement, as 
many officers are not equipped to combat the high-caliber guns em-
ployed by the cartels.154 Much of the Mexican police force is armed 
with older, low caliber weaponry and lacks body armor; it is thus unable 
to control the virtually militarized DTOs.155 The severe imbalance in 
firepower has necessitated the use of the Mexican military, as the police 
force has been rendered inoperable.156 
 Although buyers can legally obtain firearms in the United States, 
many weapons are also available from illegal, unregulated sources.157 In 
actuality, it appears that few federally-licensed dealers engage in firearm 
trafficking, suggesting that many “crime guns,” or those suspected to 
have been used in a crime, come from other, illicit sources.158 Policing 
these weapons is generally done through a system known as “e-Trace,” 
that permits authorities to follow the movement of a weapon from a 
manufacturer or importer to a first purchaser.159 Serial numbers or 
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other information about the weapon is submitted to the ATF’s National 
Tracing Center to determine the original source of the weapon.160 
Mexico has submitted weapons to the United States for tracing—
between 2004 and 2008, the ATF was able to determine the original 
source of the weapon for only 52 percent of tracing requests.161 
                                                                                                                     
 Tracing the number and type of weapons used by the Mexican 
DTOs has proved difficult under current U.S. regulations.162 Although 
the ATF has increased its use of traces on crime guns, the data remains 
incomplete because it does not account for all weapons used in Mexico; 
it instead accounts only for weapons both seized by authorities and 
submitted for trace.163 This has proven to be an obstacle to policing 
those involved in arms smuggling because officials are unable to dis-
cern clear trafficking patterns that might be useful for making arrests 
and seizing weapons.164 It is likely, however, that the ATF will be forced 
to continue to operate with limited tracing data, as the gun lobby has 
expressed strong opposition to the creation of a national database.165 
 Moreover, the firearm purchases are generally made by “straw pur-
chasers,” individuals with clean background records who are paid by 
representatives of various DTOs to purchase firearms.166 The use of 
straw purchasers insulates the actual owner from the transaction by 
concealing his identity.167 Thus, the problems presented by a limited 
ability to trace a weapon are compounded by an inability to identify the 
ultimate owner in many firearm sales.168 
 Project Gunrunner is the ATF initiative targeted specifically at re-
ducing firearms trafficking to Mexico, yet it has been hampered by its 
reliance on incomplete tracing data.169 In implementing this project, 
the ATF analyzes data from crime guns supplied by the Mexican gov-
ernment.170 One operation under Project Gunrunner, known as “Fast 
and Furious,” attempted to use e-Trace to establish links between 
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weapon purchases and high ranking members of the cartels.171 ATF 
officials in Phoenix spent nearly $650,000 on just over 1000 weapons 
and permitted “gunwalking,” or allowing known straw purchasers to 
make the firearm sales.172 Tracing after the sale proved difficult, how-
ever, as ATF officials in Mexico were only able to learn of weapons sei-
zures through public sources like newspapers, and could only access 
weapons for a few days following seizure before the Mexican military 
locked the guns in a vault.173 The operation ended after an ATF agent 
was killed by one of the weapons associated with the program.174 
 In order to bolster individual domestic initiatives, the United States 
and Mexico agreed on a support package largely focused on providing 
military assistance and financial aid for Mexican security forces.175 The 
Mérida Initiative signed in 2007 by Mexican President Felipe Calderón 
and President George W. Bush, promised $400 million in aid in the first 
year, with an estimated total payment of over $1 billion over three 
years.176 The initiative represents an international complement to U.S. 
domestic efforts to reduce demand for illegal drugs, halt the trafficking 
of firearms and weapons, and prosecute criminals engaged in drug traf-
ficking.177 Additionally, the initiative aims to support law enforcement to 
improve public security, and to strengthen the Mexican judicial struc-
ture and rule of law.178 One objective of this program is to reduce the 
U.S. demand for drugs in an effort to curtail the growth of some of the-
se organizations.179 The ultimate success of the Mérida Initiative is ques-
tionable, however, as drug related killings have dramatically increased in 
the years since its signing.180 In March 2010, the initiative was revised to 
address this violence by increasing funding for civilian police training 
and reducing military technical assistance.181 
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III. Analysis 
 The violence associated with drug trafficking now threatens every 
aspect of Mexico’s national security.182 DTOs have infiltrated Mexican 
government and law enforcement using threats and bribery,183 and 
have maintained economic growth in the face of a financial down-
turn.184 The “politically savvy” DTOs have forced the Mexican govern-
ment to engage military forces to battle the heavily armed cartels, as 
traditional forms of law enforcement have been ineffective.185 These 
organizations have risen to a level of power never before seen in the 
Mexican criminal context, and are expanding to create a threat to the 
international community.186 Despite the fact that criminal law is tradi-
tionally a domestic matter,187 such a limitation in this context has inhib-
ited the ability of the Mexican government to reduce the levels of vio-
lence, and has contributed to a staggering death toll.188 As such, the 
failure of the United States and Mexico to create an international solu-
tion virtually guarantees that the arms trafficking problem and the as-
sociated violence will continue.189 
                                                                                                                      
 
182 See Bailey, supra note 75, at 327 (“What in the past had been a chronic but tolerable 
problem of public security has passed the tipping point to become a genuine threat to 
national security and democratic governance.”). 
183 Cf. id. at 331 (noting that part of President Calderón’s strategic plan to address the 
DTOs is to purge corrupt people from the Mexican police force). 
184 See id. at 327; Kopel, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that Mexican cartels earn ap-
proximately twenty-five billion dollars in revenue a year, which amounts to two percent of 
the gross domestic product of Mexico). 
185 See Bailey, supra note 75, at 327; Wright, supra note 4, at 368 (“The government’s 
plan . . . led some to predict a prolonged violence in the country with little or no gains in 
public order.”). 
186 Bailey, supra note 75, at 327. 
187 See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 
105 Mich. L. Rev. 985, 986 (2007) (“[I]nternational criminal law has largely been en-
forced at either the purely domestic or the international level.”). 
188 See Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Crim-
inal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 97, 102–03 (“The key insight 
is that government inaction is just as likely to limit freedom as government action.”); 
Turner, supra note 187, at 989 (“While international crimes often do not create external-
ities for powerful states, the argument that the international community must act to pre-
vent and punish international crimes has deep moral resonance.”); Miglierini, supra note 
34 (suggesting that the death toll associated with Mexican drug violence is now over 
34,000). 
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developing a relationship that recognizes the importance of dynamic responses to change, 
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L.J. 2599, 2602 (1997) (“[T]he modern transformation of sovereignty has remade interna-
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A. The Importance of International Cooperation: A Brief Digression into the 
Cross Border Pharmaceutical Trade 
 In a global economy, domestic regulatory schemes are subject to 
influence and arbitrage from competing policies abroad.190 The conse-
quences of this modern dilemma are evident in the illegal pharmaceuti-
cal trade between the United States and Mexico.191 U.S. citizens are able 
to purchase pharmaceuticals in Mexico, or online from Mexican dis-
tributers, at a much lower cost than in the United States, and are not 
required to report those purchases under U.S. law.192 The pharmaceuti-
cal market has evolved in a remarkably parallel fashion to the illegal 
arms market, as Mexican cities near the border host nearly ten times as 
many pharmacies as exist in comparably sized cities across the border.193 
The importation of pharmaceuticals through unregulated channels has 
grown enormously, and threatens to compete with drugs available in the 
legal prescription market.194 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
has extensive regulations designed to protect people and markets from 
illegal or counterfeit drugs, yet those rules only apply to those who will-
ingly subject themselves to the intended regulatory system.195 In other 
words, the regulatory scheme is not equipped to address the growing 
market for drugs imported across the border.196 The wide availability of 
drugs in Mexico suggests that the “grey market” of pharmaceutical 
drugs will continue to proliferate, undermining the efforts of the 
FDA.197 The extensive regulatory scheme prohibiting the importation of 
pharmaceuticals is thus likely to become extraneous as consumers are 
able to purchase drugs at a lower cost abroad.198 
 The pharmaceutical trade affects more than just the ability of U.S. 
citizens to access drugs.199 Pricing mechanisms in individual countries 
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193 Id. at 322–23. 
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reflect an internal regulatory attitude: some systems impose higher 
prices to facilitate research, while others offer drugs at lower prices to 
improve access.200 The concern is that a divergence from the intended 
policy may undermine high-price regulatory systems and reduce finan-
cial support for research and development, which may in turn threaten 
the ability to provide low cost drugs to benefit low income countries in 
the future.201 Although current patients may thus benefit from lower 
priced drugs, the quality of future medicine may be sacrificed due to 
the reduced revenue available for research.202 As such, the deliberate 
attempt to create a regulatory structure to promote domestic interests 
may be rendered irrelevant by the flowering grey market of pharma-
ceutical drugs.203 
 In the present instance, Mexican attempts to restrict access to 
weapons will be similarly undermined.204 Drug and arms traffickers will 
continue to take advantage of the disparities in legal systems, trading 
illegal narcotics for guns across the border between the United States 
and Mexico.205 To prevent Mexican gun control laws from meeting the 
same fate as FDA regulations in the prescription drug context, the 
United States ought to consider the international implications of its 
domestic gun policy.206 
 Where issues with international implications are presented, com-
bining international and domestic considerations is difficult because of 
the inherent self-interest employed by nation-states in the international 
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sphere.207 State governments are charged with protecting the interests 
of those within their borders, so any conflicting interests have the po-
tential to impede international cooperation.208 Within issues of domes-
tic significance, contemplation of international obligations is often 
avoided by the United States due to a fear that such considerations 
would result in damage to U.S. sovereignty.209 Additionally, courts fear 
that application of international law threatens the separation of powers 
by encouraging the judiciary to enter into foreign affairs or other areas 
traditionally vested in the other two branches.210 
 The use of foreign law in areas of constitutional interpretation has 
been severely criticized.211 Justice Scalia discouraged the Court’s con-
sideration of international practices, noting that “views of other nations 
. . . cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.”212 
Even in cases related to U.S. treaties, the Court has been reluctant to 
consider the foreign court’s interpretation of treaty provisions.213 Thus, 
in the present case, it is extremely unlikely that the courts or the legisla-
ture would consider the Mexican gun problem when defining Second 
Amendment policy or ownership rights.214 
 Yet the importance of considering the potential international im-
plications of domestic regulations and policy should not be under-
stated.215 The modern world is experiencing a trend toward globaliza-
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tion and away from explicit national sovereignty.216 Such globalization 
entails inter-reliance in business, economy, policy and crime.217 The 
international economy permits regulations to be subject to arbitrage 
and exploitation, suggesting that nations ought to consider the global 
effect of domestic regulations.218 In the present instance, Mexican gun 
control regulations have been ineffective because of conflicting restric-
tions in the United States in the same way U.S. FDA regulations were 
undermined by the availability of pharmaceutical drugs in Mexico.219 
B. War in the War on Drugs 
 In 2009, President George W. Bush spoke with Guatemalan Presi-
dent Oscar Berger concerning the relationship between the U.S. de-
mand for drugs and the Central American source of drugs.220 President 
Bush stated, “Our countries are working together to fight transnational 
gangs. . . . You’ve got to understand that these gangs are able to move 
throughout Central America and up through Mexico into our own 
country, and therefore, we’ve got to think regionally and act region-
ally.”221 
 Within the United States, however, the debate over gun control re-
form has been internally focused—simultaneously highly polarized and 
muddled with conflicting interpretations of existing authorities.222 Nev-
ertheless, nearly all states with a constitutional provision for firearms 
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have explicitly allowed for an individual right of ownership.223 This sug-
gests that the individual right to own guns is closely held—perhaps par-
ticularly so by citizens residing near the Mexican border—and thus reg-
ulation will not be enacted without opposition.224 
 Arms trafficking to DTOs will likely continue without a founda-
tional change in U.S. or international drug and firearm policy.225 In 
2007, over 24,000 people died in the United States as a result of 
drugs.226 Mexico’s homicide rate is currently more than three times the 
world average.227 Moreover, despite qualms about revising constitu-
tional rights based on foreign impact228 the violence is no longer simply 
contained within Mexico.229 In addition to many domestic murders and 
kidnappings, the U.S. government has cited the DTOs as a potential 
threat to national security.230 Practically, then, it appears that the Unit-
ed States may be providing the framework to arm the most prolific 
criminal organizations in history.231 
 Regulations targeted at reducing trafficking or sales to known 
DTO members would likely withstand challenge under Heller or 
McDonald.232 Each case reserves discretion for police and national secu-
rity issues by permitting certain types of regulations to stand despite 
potential infringement on Second Amendment rights.233 Regulations 
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that do not amount to a total ban on access to usable weapons, or those 
that are tangentially related to ownership by U.S. citizens are thus likely 
to withstand constitutional challenge.234 Still, any U.S. regulation aimed 
at decreasing arms trafficking to Mexico would have to be sufficiently 
tailored to fit within the social context of the strong preference for 
permitting ownership of firearms.235 
 The originalist analysis in both Heller and McDonald of the Second 
Amendment lend little support to an argument against passing regula-
tions restricting access to weapons by those involved in DTOs because 
such a restriction would not be related to a U.S. citizen’s ability to own 
a gun.236 Practically, it is the current regulations, permitting access to 
weapons, that defines the scope of the Second Amendment right.237 
After Heller, it is understood to mean an individual right to carry a 
weapon for self-defense; and most gun control regulations are primarily 
concerned with uses for other reasons.238 In some regard, this ought to 
lessen concerns about too much government oversight of gun-owners 
by conceding that ownership is no longer related to the creation of an 
anti-government militia.239 Registration requirements need not be in-
stinctively distrusted, or thought to be prelude to confiscation.240 
 Regulations prohibiting a foreign citizen from bypassing his own 
country’s laws are neither prohibited nor informed by the Second 
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Amendment.241 Moreover, a person has no Second Amendment right 
to sell illegal guns, or to sell to prohibited persons.242 A right of access 
to high-power weapons by straw purchasers, and an ability to sell illegal 
weapons without risk of prosecution is therefore not defined by the Se-
cond Amendment, but merely by a lack of enforcement mechanisms.243 
The problem of DTO access to weapons is thus not permitted by the 
Second Amendment, rather, it often carries on in spite of it.244 
 One operation aimed at reducing arms trafficking highlights the 
inability of law enforcement to effectively trace or halt the trafficking of 
weapons.245 Operation Fast and Furious involved an attempt to trace 
weapons to cartel members who purchased guns from undercover ATF 
agents.246 Poor execution, an inadequate statutory framework, and in-
effective enforcement mechanisms ensured that the operation ended 
in tragic failure.247 Despite the fact that Congress has been unwilling to 
strengthen gun-control laws, it has expressed outrage at the idea that 
the government was supplying DTO members with weapons.248 Yet with 
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the current legal framework in place, is the mere provision of access to 
weapons sufficiently distinct from actually supplying weapons to DTOs? 
 The Mexican arms trafficking dilemma demonstrates that an inap-
propriate convergence of laws has occurred where U.S. regulations are 
dominant.249 Conflicting goals, as well as problems in coordination, 
have created gaps250 that permit trafficking to continue.251 Mexican re-
strictions on access to weapons have not prevented DTO members from 
acquiring high-power weapons because those guns are widely available 
in the United States.252 Thus, the central problem in arms trafficking is 
the ease with which purchasers can obtain weapons, legally and illegally, 
in the United States.253 As evidence, numerous Mexican and U.S. offi-
cials have cited U.S. gun regulations as the source of the problem, and 
proposed U.S. legal reform as the solution.254 Although reform of U.S. 
policies in the way of restricting access to high-caliber weapons may en-
courage a reduction of violence in Mexico, it is unlikely that the United 
States would undergo domestic reform in that area.255 
 Without a foundational reform in international gun control, ef-
forts focused on policing along the border will continue to be ineffi-
cient and inadequate.256 Moreover, the U.S. government has admitted 
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that its own policing agencies are unable to effectively address the gun 
trafficking problem in the face of current gun control regulations.257 
Yet so far, U.S. efforts have generally been limited to targeted police 
initiatives along the border, and have not included directives aimed at 
comprehensive reform of drug and gun use.258 In 2009, the U.S. gov-
ernment implemented a $95 million outbound inspection program.259 
Nevertheless, the port director in El Paso Texas noted that while his 
team had recovered nearly $400,000 in cash, they had recovered only 
one handgun during the first six weeks of searches at four border cross-
ing points.260 In 2010, the Obama administration pledged 1200 troops 
to the Mexican border to aid in the fight against drug smuggling.261 
The decision was applauded by those who interpreted it as a timely so-
lution to violence and immigration issues.262 Even so, in 2010 approxi-
mately 9000 persons were killed in Mexico in associated drug vio-
lence.263 Accordingly, a continuation of current unilateral policing 
efforts will be insufficient to reduce the number of firearms crossing 
the border.264 
 In the same vein, the success of unilateral efforts to monitor the 
black market for small weapons rests on reform of U.S. law and pol-
icy.265 The United States has implemented many programs intended to 
address the issue of gun smuggling, but admits that there has been little 
success in reducing the number of weapons transported across the bor-
der.266 The United States has spent over $1 billion on programs for the 
ATF and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to combat arms 
trafficking, but acknowledged that these efforts have been unsuccessful 
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in light of legal constraints and lack of coordination.267 The ATF pro-
gram, Project Gunrunner, has inherent flaws based on the overriding 
legal restrictions, including an inability to meet its own goals or to ana-
lyze the success, if any, of the program overall.268 The problem remains 
that the focus of both of these programs is policing: merely increasing 
law enforcement efforts without facilitating needed legal reform.269 
 Other organizations devoted to international crime have been sim-
ilarly ineffective in addressing the problem of arms trafficking, due in 
part to a lack of true cooperation by the United States.270 Across the 
globe, many regulatory and policy-based efforts are enacted by inter-
governmental organizations.271 The Organization of American States 
(OAS) operates as the primary regional organization with regard to 
international criminal issues.272 The OAS has exerted significant effort 
in combating drug smuggling from Latin America, but its attempts to 
create regional harmonization have been largely undermined by the 
United States’ internal focus on gun policy and general rejection of 
multilateralism.273 For example, in its report concerning the arms traf-
ficking dilemma, the U.S. Government Accountability Office made no 
mention of OAS collaborative efforts, instead focusing entirely on ATF 
and ICE measures.274 It is unlikely that any initiative spearheaded by an 
inter-governmental organization would be effective due to the United 
States’ reluctance, for political reasons, to enter into or cooperate with 
these types of organizations.275 Thus, current initiatives, both bilateral 
and unilateral, have proven ineffective in reducing the number of arms 
transported to Mexico from the United States.276 
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 Moving forward, one option may be a directed bilateral initiative 
targeted at drug and arms trafficking.277 Mexican efforts have been 
rendered effectively irrelevant in the current circumstances.278 A uni-
lateral U.S. initiative aimed at international arms trafficking, while con-
stitutionally viable, would likely be met with opposition from the pow-
erful gun lobby that refutes the connection between U.S. arms dealers 
and Mexican violence.279 Similarly, state action is unlikely in this area 
due to prevailing attitudes toward lenient restrictions on ownership and 
sales.280 In contrast to unilateral efforts, a coherent strategy would si-
multaneously embrace the growing trend toward globalization while 
encouraging both parties to clearly assert their national interests as they 
move forward.281 Further, the United States’ general aversion to multi-
lateral treaties suggests that an agreement with a more regional focus 
may appropriately address U.S. concerns in the drug war without rais-
ing political concerns related to extensive international obligations.282 
 A bilateral initiative focusing on international crime is not a new 
idea.283 The growth of international crime alongside globalization and 
regional integration has encouraged governments worldwide to adopt 
international criminal procedures.284 Recent efforts to create interna-
tional criminal standards in the areas of terrorism and money launder-
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ing have been well received.285 In contrast, as the international commu-
nity trends toward globalization, the United States’ persistent disregard 
of international law and cooperation threatens the reputation of the 
U.S. legal system, and may undermine future efforts to obtain assistance 
on U.S. initiatives.286 
 Although there has been no final agreement to date, several fac-
tors suggest that a concerted effort in the future is not unlikely.287 The 
United States has initiated several programs related to the war on 
drugs, many of which contemplate cooperation with Mexico.288 One is 
the Mérida Initiative, a $1 billion program aimed at improving Mex-
ico’s law enforcement capacity and bolstering shared interests includ-
ing intelligence, prosecution, and extradition.289 This agreement has 
been criticized, however, for merely increasing funds for ineffective 
programs and for promoting a U.S. focus on militarization.290 The plan 
underwent revision in 2010 after acknowledgement that the war against 
DTOs had made little headway,291 suggesting that the United States 
recognizes the importance of its role moving forward. Unfortunately, 
this recognition has translated into increased funds for policing the 
border, and other measures that have proven unsuccessful in address-
ing the problem.292 
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Conclusion 
 It is true of course, that the rights explicit within the Constitution 
deserve our utmost protection and reverence both in society at large 
and as members of the legal community. The Second Amendment 
granting the right to own guns has been closely held by U.S. citizens 
since the country’s founding. Yet, since then, it has become a polarized, 
nearly untouchable, debate based more on politics than substance. The 
alarming number and rate of deaths in Mexico may present an oppor-
tunity for a new understanding of the impact of U.S. gun policy. 
 Mexican DTOs present a threat to Mexican and U.S. citizens alike. 
It is unlikely that any person would interpret the Second Amendment 
as guaranteeing criminals access to any weapons at all, much less mili-
tary-grade assault rifles, tanks and grenades. Rather than merely ensur-
ing that citizens can protect themselves against each other or the gov-
ernment, U.S. policy has created a paramilitary criminal organization 
in Mexico—paying them for drugs, and allowing weapons to be pur-
chased with the profits. 
 As the world trends toward globalization, there ought to be exten-
sive consideration of international implications within domestic policy. 
The strictly internal focus of the United States in the enactment of 
rules and regulations has facilitated tragic consequences for Mexican 
citizens across the border. Although the U.S. government is rightly 
charged with protecting the interests of its own citizens, social circum-
stances within the national and international community indicate that 
this may no longer be the only valid consideration. Describing the 
problems ahead, Attorney General Holder summed up the issue thusly: 
“We have serious problems to address—and sacred responsibilities to 
fulfill. We must not lose sight of what’s really at stake here: lives, futures, 
families, and communities.”293 
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